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a b s t r a c t
Studies on pretense mental state understanding in young children
have produced inconsistent findings. These findings could
potentially emerge from the confounding influences of action
manipulation or the failure to examine possible influences on indi-
vidual children’s performances. To address these issues, we created
a task in which 68 3- and 4-year-olds viewed two actors, side by
side, on a monitor. Children were told that one actor was knowl-
edgeable about a specific animal, whereas the other actor was
not. The actors performed identical movements that were either
related or unrelated to the animal they were mimicking or engaged
in different behaviors contradictory to their knowledge. Saliency of
action was also manipulated by presenting either dynamic images
or a paused frame of the actors’ behavior (i.e., the static condition).
Children performed similarly on the dynamic and static conditions.
Children selected the knowledgeable actor more often in the unre-
lated and related trials but were not as successful at selecting the
knowledgeable actor when the actor’s knowledge contradicted
the actor’s behavior. Therefore, by 3 years of age, some children
may understand that pretend play involves mental representations
and appreciate that the mind influences a pretender’s behavior. To
investigate the observed individual differences, we also examined
children and parents as they engaged in reading and pretense
activities prior to data collection. The frequency of parents’ cogni-
tive mental state utterances strongly predicted performance on the
mental state task. Individual differences in performance as a result
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of parental language and executive functioning abilities are
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Introduction
Children accept the most extraordinary scenarios in their play. They pretend to be princesses and
dragons living in elaborate moat-protected castles, and they find joy in tasks that adults go about
begrudgingly (e.g., making dinner). There has been considerable research examining the cognitive
mechanisms underlying pretense (Nichols & Stich, 2000; Schroeder & Matheson, 2006). Theories
regarding these mechanisms differ on the subject of children’s awareness of mental states during pre-
tend play (e.g., manipulation and monitoring of the mind’s content), especially before 5 years of age.
The two main views of young children’s understanding of mental states during pretend activities
are termed the action hypothesis and the mental state hypothesis (see Ganea, Lillard, & Turkheimer,
2004, for a review). The action hypothesis posits that children associate pretend play with actions
before realizing the mind’s involvement (Lillard, 1993; Perner, 1991). According to this hypothesis,
young children do not appreciate the knowledge of a pretender as being important to the pretend play
and instead focus on the action of the pretender (Lillard, 1993).
The key study supporting the action hypothesis is Lillard’s (1993) ‘‘Moe’’ study. In this study, 4- and
5-year-olds were presented with dolls that acted out behaviors. For example, if ‘‘Moe’’ had never seen
a rabbit and had no knowledge regarding rabbits but was hopping like a rabbit, children were asked
whether or not Moe was pretending to be a rabbit. Most 4-year-olds responded that Moe was pretend-
ing to be a rabbit. Thus, they ignored the lack of information Moe possessed mentally in favor of
concentrating on his actions.
In contrast to the action hypothesis, the mental state hypothesis of pretense posits that the under-
standing of mental state is a necessary component of pretense understanding (Leslie, 1987) and that
young children appreciate the role of the pretender as being important to pretend play (Gottfried,
Kickling, Totten, Mkroyan, & Reisz, 2003; Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano,
2004). This is illustrated by Bruell and Woolley (1998), who had 3- and 4-year-olds view images
depicting two characters interacting with an object (e.g., a cardboard box). The characters performed
the same actions with the box (e.g., touched the box as if pressing buttons), but a ‘‘thought bubble’’
appeared above each of their heads to indicate what each character was pretending the object to
be. For example, one actor had a thought bubble containing a horse, and the other had a thought bub-
ble containing a car. In subsequent questioning, children were asked what the actors were pretending
the object should be and what the actors were actually doing with the object. Children performed well
when given the thought bubbles. When the actor’s thoughts were made salient in the thought bubble,
even young children displayed an understanding of the mental representations in pretend play. Their
findings support the mental state hypothesis that young children do possess the ability to understand
that the mind is important when interacting with others during pretend play.
Perhaps the discrepancies between the action-based and mental state-based hypotheses are due to
individual differences and environmental influences. Limited research has addressed the role of indi-
vidual differences in children’s understanding of mental states in their pretend play (Hughes & Dunn,
1997; Hughes, Ensor, & Marks, 2011; Lillard & Witherington, 2004; Sabbagh & Callanan, 1998). One
possible factor contributing to individual differences on mental state tasks is the type of language
caregivers and children use when engaged in pretend play.
The ability to appreciate that the mind of a pretender is important during pretense activities has
been linked with increased use of mental state language by parents (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski,
Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2008). Parental use of mental state terms has
been associated with the amount of time children are engaged in pretend play activities and the
complexity of that pretend play (Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2000; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). Jenkins,
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Turrell, and Kogushi (2003) found that increased use of cognitive mental state speech by parents that
references the mind by using terms such as ‘‘think’’ and ‘‘remember’’ during play and reading time was
related to increased use of this type of speech by children and to mental state understanding. The role
of parental language in children’s understanding of mental states during pretend play has not been
explored.
The goal of the current study was to explore which hypothesis—action or mental state—more
accurately explains how 3- and 4-year-olds understand pretend play episodes by using both new
and modified methodologies. It also aimed to investigate the possibility that individual differences
in the type of language parents and children use during their interactions may account for the mixed
results found in prior studies. Children completed a mental state task and were video-recorded with
their parents during a reading and pretend play activity to look at the language used during that activ-
ity. The mental state task used a methodology similar to that used by Ganea and colleagues (2004). In
their study, 3- and 4-year-olds were presented with two actors side by side on a screen. Children were
told the intention of one of the actors (‘‘I am going to fly like a bird now’’) even though the actor was
acting contradictory to that intention (e.g., he was jumping up and down). The second actor on the
screen behaved appropriately for the animal used in the example (e.g., the actor behaved like a bird)
but was not intending to be a bird. Both 3- and 4-year-olds selected the appropriately behaved actor
more than the actor that intended to behave like a bird when asked which actor was pretending to be
a bird. Children relied more on action when a comparison was presented between the appropriately
and inappropriately behaved pretenders and ignored the intentions of the character.
The current study also presented children with a mental state task with two actors side by side on
the screen, but in contrast to Ganea and colleagues’ (2004) study, children in the current study were
provided with information regarding the actor’s knowledge instead of the actor’s intention when
asked to decide which actor was pretending. This was due to the inconsistent findings of children’s
understanding of intentions before 5 years of age (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Mitchell & Neal,
2005; Rakoczy et al., 2004) and the fact that children have demonstrated an appreciation of knowledge
as an important factor in pretend play activities by 3 years of age (Gottfried et al., 2003). In addition,
previous research has employed knowledge and thought as the information presented to younger chil-
dren in mental state tasks (Lillard, 1993; Sobel, 2004).
Most studies have not controlled for the potential confounding influences of action dynamism
(Ganea et al., 2004; Lillard, 1993). In traditional trials, children could focus on either action or knowl-
edge when deciding whether an actor was pretending. In the current study, during the mental state
task, three presentation formats that manipulated the action and knowledge of an actor were pre-
sented to each child. In contrast to previous studies, one of these presentation formats eliminated
the possibility that children could rely on action and instead forced children to select based on the
actor’s knowledge (as articulated by the experimenter). In addition, if children view pretend play as
action based (as according to the action hypothesis), increasing the saliency of an actor’s behavior
would make it more difficult for children to appreciate the actor’s mental state because the action
would be harder to ignore. To investigate this possibility, children in the current study saw two actors
moving simultaneously on a television screen in a dynamic condition or saw only a paused frame
depicting actors as if engaged in a particular behavior (i.e., the static condition).
Finally, studies have found evidence to support both the action-based and mental state-based
hypotheses with only slight variations in methodology (Bruell & Woolley, 1998; Lillard, 1993;
Sobel, 2004). Perhaps these differences are due to unexplored individual differences in children’s
environments. Research has identified that mental state utterances by parents are related to mental
state understanding in their children; therefore, this factor was investigated in anticipation that it
would aid in explaining the variation in previous findings (Jenkins et al., 2003). To accomplish this
goal, parents and children engaged in reading and pretend play activities before the children
completed a mental state task, and their mental state utterances were recorded.
It was hypothesized that children would be less successful at selecting the knowledgeable actor as
the one pretending if the actor’s behaviors did not appear to match the actor’s knowledge during the
dynamic condition compared with the static condition because the children would have difficulty in
overriding the information from salient actions. In support of the mental state hypothesis, the current
hypotheses predicted an understanding of mental states in pretense activities earlier than that posited
D.K. Melzer, L.J. Claxton / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 128 (2014) 21–36 23
by the action hypothesis. It was also predicted that parents who place more emphasis on using words
that highlight mental states, specifically cognitive terms, would have children who were more
successful at selecting a knowledgeable actor compared with an unknowledgeable actor during the
mental state task (Jenkins et al., 2003).
Method
Participants
The participants were 73 3- and 4-year-old children from the Amherst and Springfield communi-
ties of Massachusetts in the northeastern United States. Children’s names and contact information
were obtained from town hall birth records, birth announcements, and parental responses to flyers
distributed to local preschools. Of the original sample, five participants were excluded due to an
inability to complete the protocol. Therefore, 68 participants (33 girls and 35 boys) were included
in the final analyses: 39 3-year-olds (Mage = 40 months, range = 37–42) and 29 4-year-olds (Mage = 51 -
months, range = 48–56). Children were predominantly of Caucasian ethnicity and from middle- to
upper middle-class backgrounds. Procedures were approved by the university institutional review
board.
Materials
A digital video camera was used to record the entire session for later offline coding. To encourage
parent–child interactions, a number of objects designed to promote pretend play were available in the
testing room during the pretend play activity. A bucket containing kitchenware, stuffed animals,
plastic figures, and dress-up clothing and hats (e.g., ballerina outfit, fireman hat, construction hat)
was available to participants. Two books were used during the reading activity. Rainy Day by Anna
Milbourne was selected because it included vibrantly colored pictures, had few written words, and
discussed topics interesting to children. I Just Forgot by Mercer Mayer was selected for its references
to the mind and for the popularity of the little critter character with preschool-age children.
For the mental state task, 12 different animal-appropriate actions produced by actors (7 females
and 5 males) were videotaped (Table 1). The animal-appropriate actions were determined during pilot
testing. Videos of the actors engaged in actions were shown to 15 preschool-age children. The children
were asked what animal they believed the person was imitating. The animals selected were the ones
the children correctly identified the actors as portraying 85% to 95% of the time during pilot testing.
The animals were further separated into two groups. The six animals for which children had the high-
est percentage of correct responses (bunny, dog, elephant, chicken, monkey, and frog) were placed in
Group A, and the six animals with the lower percentage of correct responses (snake, fish, crocodile,
Table 1
Animal identities and actor’s associated behaviors used during mental state task.
Animal identity Actor’s behavior
Bunny Hopping, standing upright, hands curled in front of body
Dog Crawling on hands and knees
Elephant Waving one arm up and down in front of face (like trunk movement)
Chicken Arms on hips, elbows flapping in synchronous motion
Monkey Arms outstretched and uneven on sides, moving up and down in a synchronous motion
Frog Hopping up and down in crouching position
Fish Swimming arms at shoulder height in synchronous motion
Bird Arms outstretched, waving up and down in synchronous motion
Spider Wiggling fingers up and down next to face
Crocodile Opening and closing both arms in front of face (a biting action)
Snake Slithering on stomach on floor
Penguin Waddling back and forth while standing upright
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penguin, spider, and bird) were placed in Group B. Children were placed into one of two groups. The
first group received the A animal identities, and the second group received the B animal identities. This
was done to rule out animal identity as a confounding factor in children’s performance and to make it
easier to interpret the results if differences were found between the higher and lower response groups.
Actors did not display emotion (e.g., smiling, frowning) or facial behavioral cues associated with
the animals (e.g., did not suck in cheeks if acting like a fish). Actors used body motion only to demon-
strate animal behaviors.
A DVD player and a 26-inch television were used to present the six pairs of static or dynamic stim-
uli given to each child on the mental state task. Using Final Cut Pro, the individual movies were spliced
together to create a split screen effect. Two actors, side by side, appeared in the clip moving according
to the animal behavior they were assigned. In the static condition, a specific frame from the original
video depicting the actor in the middle of one of the activities (e.g., arms at shoulder height as if flap-
ping them up and down) was captured and paused to create a still image of the actor’s behavior.
Design and procedure
For each participant, parent–child interaction activities (pretend play and storybook) were com-
pleted first, followed by the mental state task. The interaction activities were placed before the mental
state task to increase the child’s comfort level in the laboratory setting. For the mental state task, each
child was assigned to one of four groups: (a) animal identities A/static group, (b) animal identities A/
dynamic group, (c) animal identities B/static group, or (d) animal identities B/dynamic group. Within
these conditions, the child was presented with two trials of each presentation format (Same Related
Action, Contradictory Action, and Same Unrelated Action) for a total of six trials.
Parent–child interaction
At the start of the session, the experimenter explained the procedure for either the pretend play or
storybook phase of the experiment and then left the room. The order of the parent–child interaction
activities was counterbalanced. For the pretend play segment, the parent was instructed to improvise
and use as many or few of the toys as desired in order to engage the child in pretend play activities for
approximately 10 min.
For the storybook reading activity, the experimenter presented the parent with the two books and
instructed the parent to read to the child as the parent would do in his or her own home. This activity
took 10 min to complete as well. Parents were instructed to reread the books if they finished before
the 10-min time period had elapsed.
After completing both the pretend play and storybook activities, the parent was given a brief
survey asking about parental education. The parent was also asked about the child’s familiarity with
the animals and the associated behavioral actions being used in the mental state task. For example, the
parent was given the word ‘‘fish’’ and then the accompanying behavioral action (e.g., swimming arms
at shoulder height) and was asked to indicate if the child was familiar with the animal and the asso-
ciated behavior. Parents of all 68 participants indicated that their children were familiar with the
listed terms used for the animals except for ‘‘crocodile.’’ Because five of the children were more famil-
iar with ‘‘alligator,’’ that term was substituted during the mental state task trial involving that animal.
Mental state task
Following the parent–child interactions, the experimenter removed the books and toys from the
room and brought in art supplies that the experimenter and child used to create the ‘‘pretend hat.’’
A forced-choice paradigm was used in the current study to limit the need for the child to respond ver-
bally to questions. Instead, the child indicated the actor he or she believed to be pretending by placing
a small hat on the actor’s head. This hat was referred to as the pretend hat. By using a forced-choice
paradigm, we eliminated the possibility that children might reply ‘‘I don’t know’’ or ‘‘neither’’ because
they did not need to respond verbally when asked to select which actor was pretending to be the
animal.
After creating the child’s hat, the child and experimenter put the hats on and then engaged in a pre-
tend play activity (e.g., pouring ‘‘water’’ into a cup) to emphasize that pretend play occurred while
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wearing the hats. Then the experimenter showed the child a smaller version of the pretend hat that
would be used during each of the mental state task trials. The small pretend hat was made of construc-
tion paper with a small piece of double stick tape so that it could be attached to the television. The
experimenter then explained to the child how the pretend hat would be used: ‘‘Look at what I have
here. I have a little pretend hat just like our pretend hats, and one of these boys is going to wear
it.’’ The experimenter then demonstrated how each actor on the television screen could wear the
pretend hat by attaching it to each of the actor’s heads. ‘‘When someone is pretending, they get to
wear a pretend hat just like the one we are wearing while we pretend.’’
After the introduction of the pretend hats, children began the mental state task. Children partici-
pated in either the static or dynamic condition for all six trials of the mental state task. In both con-
ditions, two actors appeared on a screen at the same time using the split screen image while the
experimenter labeled and pointed to them. Children in each static group were shown pairs of actors
paused on the screen displaying an animal behavior on each trial. Children in each dynamic group
were shown the same pair of actors, but after 5 s each actor simultaneously began his or her behaviors.
The static image or the dynamic sequence of movement continued to be visually available to children
until the mental state questions were answered.
There were three presentation formats within the mental state task: Same Related Action, Contra-
dictory Action, and Same Unrelated Action. The Same Related Action and Contradictory Action trials
were based on Ganea and colleagues’ (2004) study. All children were presented with two trials of each
presentation format. For each of the presentation formats, the knowledgeable actor had knowledge of
an animal he was pretending to be (e.g., knows about frogs), whereas a second actor, side by side with
the first actor, had knowledge of a non-animal-related activity (e.g., playing soccer).
For Same Related Action trials, both actors visible on the split screen were engaged in the same
action. However, one actor was described as possessing knowledge about an animal consistent with
the action that was portrayed and one actor was described as possessing knowledge inconsistent with
the action. For example, even though both actors were exhibiting the same behavior appropriate for an
animal (e.g., they were both crawling around on their hands and knees like a dog), one actor was
knowledgeable about the animal (e.g., dog), whereas the other actor was not knowledgeable about
the animal. To avoid the issue of children selecting an actor as the one pretending based on the
association with an animal label, each actor was described as having or not having knowledge of
the animal and a non-pretend activity. For example, the actor who was knowledgeable about dogs
was not knowledgeable about swimming, and the actor who was not knowledgeable about dogs
was knowledgeable about swimming. Which actor was knowledgeable about the animal during this
presentation format was counterbalanced. The child was told the following:
‘‘This is Bill. This is James.’’ [The experimenter points to each character on the screen.] (The position
of frames and order of descriptions were counterbalanced.) ‘‘Both Bill and James are crawling
around on their hands and knees. But they are different because Bill knows about dogs. He has a
dog and reads about dogs [pointing to Bill]. James is from far away and has never seen a dog. He
has never read about dogs and does not know what a dog is [pointing to James]. There is something
Bill does not know about, though. He does not know about swimming. He has never read about
swimming and has never seen anyone swim [pointing to Bill]. James does know about swimming.
He reads all about swimming and has seen people swim [pointing to James]. One boy is pretending
to be a dog, and one boy is swimming. Can you point to the boy pretending to be a dog so we can
give him a pretend hat just like our hat?’’
If the child did not point, the experimenter prompted the child by saying, ‘‘You are such a great pre-
tender, and I cannot figure out which of these boys should wear a hat like ours. The boy pretending to
be a dog should get it. Which one do you think it is?’’ After the child selected the actor to place the
pretend hat on, the experimenter praised the child’s effort regardless of whether the child chose
the knowledgeable or unknowledgeable actor.
If the child understood that only someone who had knowledge of a dog was able to pretend to be a
dog, the child should choose Bill. In contrast, if the child did not understand that knowledge was
important in pretend play and instead based his or her response on the behavior of the actors, the
child should be equally likely to choose either Bill or James.
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The Contradictory Action trial instructions were the same as the Same Related Action trial instruc-
tions, but for this presentation format the two actors were exhibiting different behaviors. The exper-
imenter informed the child of the actor’s knowledge regarding an animal, but that actor performed
actions that did not support that knowledge. In contrast, the actor who had no knowledge of the
appropriate behavior associated with that animal nevertheless produced actions consistent with
knowledge of that animal. For example, the actor who was behaving appropriately for the animal used
in the example (e.g., was slithering around on the floor like a snake) was not knowledgeable about
snakes and instead was knowledgeable about a different activity (e.g., gymnastics). The actor who
was knowledgeable about snakes was acting inappropriately for a snake (e.g., was flapping her arms
up and down) but was not knowledgeable about a different activity (e.g., gymnastics).
Instructions for the Same Unrelated Action trials were the same as those described above for the other
two presentation formats in that the experimenter informed the child of the actors’ knowledge. How-
ever, now both actors behaved in a similar manner that was unconventional for the animal the experi-
menter was referring to in their story. For example, both actors were engaged in the same activity (e.g.,
crawling on their hands and knees), but the child was told that one actor was knowledgeable about birds
but not knowledgeable about swimming and that the other actor was knowledgeable about swimming
but not about birds. Distinct from other research, in this study children needed to ignore the action of
both actors because neither actor was behaving in accordance with the pretend animal’s identity.
Correct responses were the same for all three presentation formats. If the child understood that
only someone who had knowledge of the animal was able to pretend to be that animal, the child
would choose the actor knowledgeable about the animal. In contrast, if the child did not understand
that knowledge was important in pretend play and instead based his or her response only on the
behavior of the actors, the child either would choose the appropriately behaved actor, during the Con-
tradictory Action trials, or would be equally likely to choose either one of the actors in the Same Unre-
lated Action or Same Related Action trials. See Table 2 for further explanation of each presentation
format. To collect further information about the child’s rationale, the child was asked why he or she
chose the actor for the pretend hat.
Data scoring and analysis
Parent–child interactions
The parent’s and child’s mental state utterances from the videotape recordings obtained during
each of the 10-min pretend play and storybook phases of the experiment were examined by a primary
coder. The criterion selected for scoring mental state utterances was based on previous approaches
developed by Jenkins and colleagues (2003) and Ruffman, Slade, and Crowe (2002). Accordingly,
mental state talk was divided into four categories: desire, emotion, cognitive, and modulations of
assertion.
To ensure reliability, a trained secondary coder viewed 20% of the interactions for mental state talk.
Agreements were categorized as the same word labeled by both coders as a mental state term.
Table 2
Example of animal behavior associated with each presentation format and correct answer expected from children during trial.
Same related action Same unrelated action Contradictory action
Behavior of actor on right of screen
who is knowledgeable about birds but










Behavior of actor on left of screen who
is NOT knowledgeable about birds











Correct response to question: ‘‘Can you
point to the boy pretending to be a
bird so we can give him a pretend
hat just like our hat?’’
Child points to the actor
on right of screen who is
knowledgeable about
birds
Child points to the actor
on right of screen who is
knowledgeable about
birds
Child points to the actor
on right of screen who is
knowledgeable about
birds
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Disagreements were considered as those where one coder believed the utterance to be a mental state
term and the other coder did not, and these were resolved through further discussion until a consen-
sus was achieved. The inter-rater reliability was found to be kappa = .85 (p < .001), 95% confidence
interval (CI) [.81, .89].
Mental state task
Each trial of the mental state task was scored on the basis of whether the child picked the actor
whose knowledge permitted the opportunity to engage in pretense. The maximum number of points
a child could obtain for the mental state task was six (two for each presentation format). To assess
reliability, a secondary coder viewed 25% of the mental state tasks. The inter-rater reliability was
found to be kappa = .922 (p < .001), 95% CI [0.77, 1.07].
Mean length utterances
Mean length utterances (MLUs) were calculated to control for language ability. Past research has
supported the use of MLUs as an indicator of verbal competencies for children as old as 7 years
(Rice et al., 2010). The MLU is calculated by counting the number of morphemes in the first 100 utter-
ances of the child. The total number of morphemes is then divided by 100, resulting in the child’s MLU.
In the current study, trained research assistants calculated the MLUs from the transcription of the par-
ent–child pretend play and reading interactions according to criteria established by Williamson
(2009). To assess reliability, a secondary coder assessed 20% of the transcripts. Percentage agreement
regarding participants’ MLU scores between coders was 92%. Agreement between coders regarding
participants’ MLU scores was highly positively correlated, r(12) = .98, p < .001. Disagreements were
further discussed until a consensus was achieved.
Results
Performance on mental state trials
A preliminary analysis was carried out to examine possible confounding effects of the actor’s gen-
der, animal identity, and order on overall performance across presentation formats (six trials total)
using a 2 (Gender)  2 (Animal Identity Group: A or B)  3 (Order of Trials) analysis of variance
(ANOVA). In addition, these factors were also examined in relation to performance on each presenta-
tion format (two trials each) using a 2 (Actor’s Gender)  2 (Animal Identity Group)  3 (Order of Tri-
als)  3 (Presentation Format: Contradictory Action, Same Related Action, or Same Unrelated Action)
repeated measures ANOVA. There were no significant main effects or interactions involving any of
these factors; therefore, the data were collapsed over these factors.
Table 3 shows the distribution of children’s responses for each presentation format. A 2 (Age)  2
(Child’s Gender)  2 (Action Saliency: static or dynamic) ANOVA did not reveal any effects of age,
Table 3
Distributions and means of scores for different presentation formats of mental state task.
Number of correct trials
0 1 2 M
Same related action
3-year-olds 5 21 13 1.20 (0.65)
4-year-olds 1 11 17 1.55 (0.57)
Same unrelated action
3-year olds 3 15 21 1.46 (0.64)
4-year-olds 2 8 19 1.59 (0.63)
Contradictory action
3-year-olds 14 12 13 0.97 (0.84)
4-year-olds 5 12 12 1.24 (0.74)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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gender, or saliency of action of the pretender on the overall performance of the children. A 2 (Age)  2
(Child’s Gender)  2 (Action Saliency)  3 (Presentation Format) repeated measures ANOVA did not
reveal main effects or interactions for age, gender, or action saliency but did reveal a main effect of
presentation format, F(2,128) = 7.35, p = .001, gp2 = .10. Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction
revealed that, overall, children performed better on the Same Unrelated Action and Same Related
Action trials compared with the Contradictory Action trials (p < .001 and p = .045, respectively). No sig-
nificant difference was found for performances on the Same Related Action versus Same Unrelated
Action trials.
Of particular interest in this study was the difference in performance on the different presentation
formats between children who did relatively well on the mental state task, and therefore demon-
strated a greater understanding of mental states during pretend play (high-scoring), compared with
children who scored lower on the task (low-scoring). The high-scoring group (13 3-year-olds and
15 4-year-olds) successfully selected the knowledgeable actor as the one pretending on five or six
of the six mental state trials (n = 28). The low-scoring group (26 3-year-olds and 14 4-year-olds) cor-
rectly selected the knowledgeable actor on four or fewer of the six trials (n = 40).
A 3 (Presentation Format)  2 (Performance Level: high or low) mixed design ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect of performance level, F(1, 66) = 137.28, p < .001, gp2 = .10, and a significant
interaction between performance level and presentation format, F(1, 66) = 6.16, p = .016, gp2 = .05.
The high-scoring group was more likely to select the knowledgeable actor over the non-knowledge-
able actor (M = 5.43, SD = 0.50) compared with the low-scoring group (M = 2.93, SD = 1.05). Paired t
tests were conducted to investigate differences in performance across the presentation formats
according to performance group (high or low) using a Holm–Bonferroni adjusted alpha to control
for Type I error. The high-scoring group performed significantly better on Same Unrelated Action trials
(M = 1.96, SD = 0.19) in comparison with the Same Related Action trials (M = 1.71, SD = 0.46),
t(27) = 2.55, p = .017, d = 1.74, and the Contradictory Action trials (M = 1.75, SD = 0.44), t(27) = 2.27,
p = .031, d = 0.63. The low-scoring group performed similarly on the Same Related Action (M = 1.10,
SD = 0.63) and Same Unrelated Action (M = 1.20, SD = 0.65) trials, but was significantly less successful
on the Contradictory Action trials (M = 0.63, SD = 0.67) as compared with the Same Related Action and
Same Unrelated Action trials, t(39) = 3.32, p = .002, d = 0.73, and t(39) = 3.80, p < .001, d = 0.87,
respectively.
At the end of each mental state trial, the experimenter asked child why they had selected a specific
actor as the one pretending. The high-scoring group that concentrated on the knowledge of each actor
used mental state terms in their explanations (e.g., because he knew about birds) on 45 of 180 trials
(25%) but used behavioral explanations (e.g., because he was flapping his arms) on only four of 180
trials (2%). For the remaining 131 trials, children provided no response to the open-ended question
or responded with ‘‘I don’t know.’’ Children who focused on action instead of knowledge in the
low-scoring group used mental state terms in their explanations on only 17 of 258 trials (6%) and used
behavioral explanations on 23 of 258 trials (9%). On the remaining 218 trials, children were unable to
provide a response.
Language use and its relationship to mental state task performance
One participant was excluded from the parent–child interaction analyses due to speaking a foreign
language during interactions. All children participated in the study with their mothers except for one
child accompanied by his father. Parents had varied education levels, with the majority having fin-
ished college and many having advanced degrees (completed education levels for mothers: six high
school, 10 some college, 18 college, 21 master’s degree, and 12 post-master’s degree; completed edu-
cation levels for fathers: one GED, nine high school, 14 some college, 14 college, 15 master’s degree,
and 12 post-master’s degree).
No child gender or order effects of presentation were found, and the data were collapsed over these
conditions. The means for each of the mental state categories used by children and parents during the
parent–child interactions for the reading and pretend play periods can be found in Table 4. The total
number of mental state terms used by parents was correlated with children’s performance on the
mental state task, r(65) = .321, p = .019; children who scored higher on the mental state task had
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parents who produced more mental state utterances than children who scored lower. There was no
significant correlation between the total words uttered by parents and children’s performance on
the mental state task, r(65) = .19, p = .18. Therefore, it was not the number of utterances but rather
the number of mental state utterances used by parents during their interactions that resulted in better
performance by their children. As can be seen in Table 5, when correlations with different types of
mental state terms are considered, the strongest indicators of a higher score on the mental state task
were use of modulations of assertion and cognitive language by parents during the interaction periods,
r(65) = .27, p = .028, and r(65) = .28, p = .024, respectively.
Children’s total number of mental state utterances was not correlated with their performance on
the mental state task, but their use of cognitive utterances during the reading task was, r(65) = .27,
p = .03. Children’s modulations of assertion utterances were related to their performance,
r(65) = .26, p = .034. MLU was correlated with performance on the mental state task, r(65) = .26,
p = .04, and with children’s production of cognitive mental state terms, r(65) = .45, p < .001.
Regression analyses
A series of hierarchical regression analyses were carried out to assess what factors were predictive
of children’s mental state task performance. Children’s MLUs and parents’ modulations of assertion
were not significant predictors and were removed from the analyses.
Child’s age emerged as a significant predictor of the total number of successful trials on the mental
state task, b = .838, t(66) = 2.44, p = .018; in addition, maternal education was also found to be a sig-
nificant predictor at Step 1, b = .16, t(66) = 3.08, p = .003. The change in R2 for this step was significant
(R = .43, R2 = .19, F = 7.30, p = .001). This model indicated that approximately 16% of the variance of the
mental state task performance in the sample could be accounted for by age of the children and years of
education of their mothers.
In Step 2, parents’ cognitive mental state term utterances were entered and a significant increment
in the prediction arose, b = .04, t(66) = 2.08, p = .042; the change in R2 for this step was also significant
Table 4
Mean numbers of mental state utterances (and standard deviations) for reading and pretend play activities for parents and
children.
Desire Emotion Cognitive Modulation of
assertion
Total






















































































Correlations between mental state utterances and children’s performance on mental state task for play and reading activities.
Correlations of parent utterances with mental
state task
Correlations of child utterances with mental
state task
Read Play Total Read Play Total
Cognitive .21 .23 .28* .27* .12 .17
Desire .13 .13 .13 .07 .01 .04
Modulations of assertion .19 .21 .27* .28* .12 .26*
Emotion .12 .03 .06 .01 .04 .04
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (two-tailed).
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(R = .49, R2 = .24, F = 4.32, p = .042). The results of these analyses are presented in Table 6. Children’s
use of cognitive language during the reading activity and overall modulations of assertion did not
add significantly to the prediction of children’s performance on the mental state task, b = .152,
t(66) = 0.50, p = .62, and b = 2.0, t(66) = 1.15, p = .26, respectively. These results reveal that parents’
cognitive mental state language contributed significantly to the prediction of children’s performance
on the mental state task over and above age and maternal education. These predictors accounted for
20.2% of the variance.
Discussion
The current study explored the role of action saliency in children’s understanding of mental states
during pretense activities and investigated the role of mental state utterances in mental state
understanding. We found that young children did not exclusively pay attention to action information
when deciding about mental states. Saliency of action (dynamic vs. static) did not affect performance,
but presentation format did. Children were equally as successful in selecting the knowledgeable actor
as the pretender in the Same Unrelated Action and Same Related Action trials and were least success-
ful in the Contradictory Action trials. Therefore, children had the most difficulty in focusing on the
mental state of the actor when action conflicted with the knowledgeable actor’s knowledge and the
knowledgeable actor was presented side by side with the unknowledgeable actor who behaved more
appropriately for the animal used in the example.
In regard to individual differences, parental cognitive mental state utterances were predictive of
children’s performance on the mental state task independent of children’s age and maternal
education. Importantly, these results indicate that understanding mental states may be influenced
by environmental factors.
Understanding pretend mental states
Surprisingly, our findings did not fully support either the action-based or mental state-based
hypothesis of pretend play (Lillard, 1993; Perner, 1991). In essence, if action was an important contrib-
uting factor in how children viewed pretend play activities, the dynamic trials should have interfered
with children’s performance because actions would be more difficult to ignore compared with the sta-
tic condition. Although static images do communicate information about movement, the saliency of
action is different between a still image and a moving image. As mentioned by Sobel (2007), a video
of a moving image may focus children on the ‘‘overt action’’ of the actor versus the mental state of the
actor. When combined with the findings that some children ignored salient action and contradictory
action information, our results cannot be fully explained using the action-based hypothesis.
On the other hand, whereas saliency of movement did not affect performance, manipulating action
in the three different presentation formats did. Similar to the Contradictory Action trials in the current
study, children in Ganea and colleagues’ (2004) study had a difficult time in selecting an actor whose
behaviors were contradictory to his or her intentions when presented side by side with an actor whose
Table 6




Maternal education .16** .16**
Parents’ cognitive utterances .04*
DR2 .19** .05*
R2 .19 .24
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients.
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (two-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two-tailed).
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behavior more closely resembled those intentions. The current finding demonstrates that even when
provided with information about the actor’s knowledge as opposed to the intention, action still played
a role in how some children view pretend play. Thus, our findings are also not explained using the
mental state hypothesis.
Furthermore, high-scoring children selected the knowledgeable actor more often on the novel
Same Unrelated Action trials, compared with the other trials, when both actors behaved in a similar
manner that was unconventional for the animal to which the experimenter was referring. This finding
indicates that it may be easier for children to focus on what the actor knows when they do not need to
attend to multiple forms of information such as knowledge and behavior. When an appropriate action
was eliminated as a basis for making a judgment about mental state, as on the Same Unrelated Action
trials, it was necessary for children to rely on the actor’s knowledge.
An interesting finding that further supports the idea that children are able to ignore action infor-
mation is that the high-scoring group for the mental state task performed similarly on the Same
Related Action and Contradictory Action trials. This group of 3- and 4-year-olds ignored salient atyp-
ical behavior and correctly chose the knowledgeable actor as pretending equally often as when no
contradictory information was given. Thus, even some 3-year-olds demonstrated an appreciation of
the mind during the pretend activity. This finding has not been reported in other studies using similar
contradictory behavior trials (Ganea et al., 2004).
Furthermore, many children in this high-scoring group (6 3-year-olds and 12 4-year-olds)
responded using mental state terms (e.g., ‘‘she knew’’) when asked why they selected the correct
knowledgeable actor. Overall, the high-scoring group used mental state terms for 25% of the trials.
In Lillard’s (1993) study, 35% of 4-year-olds correctly responded that Moe was not pretending if he
did not have knowledge regarding bunnies. In the current study, 41% of children selected the knowl-
edgeable actor over the non-knowledgeable actor on at least five of the six mental state trials. Our
high-scoring children included a number of 3-year-olds, children younger than those in Lillard’s study.
Successful children’s performances should not be collapsed into the overall mean for all children
because these children exhibited an understanding of the role of mental states in pretend play. It is
critical that research explain the distinction between children who appear to have a more advanced
mental state understanding (high) compared with other children (low). The question then becomes,
why are some 3-year-olds better at this understanding than others? It might have to do with parental
language.
Role of language in pretend play mental state understanding
The current study revealed a relationship between the frequency of cognitive mental state lan-
guage by parents and performance on a mental state task. Parents who expressed more cognitive men-
tal state terms throughout the parent–child interaction had children who selected the knowledgeable
actor on the mental state task more often compared with parents who uttered fewer cognitive terms.
We were interested in how cognitive mental state utterances used by parents influenced mental
state understanding. Similar to earlier studies (Lillard, 1993), 41% of children selected the knowledge-
able actor over the non-knowledgeable actor on at least five of the six mental state trials. In earlier
studies, an emphasis was placed on average behavior, which usually indicated a lack of mental state
understanding. However, a subset of children in the current study selected the knowledgeable actor as
the one pretending. The relationship between parental language and mental state performance may
explain the discrepancy between the high and low scorers.
These findings support what has been referred to as the social constructivist view of mental state
understanding (Jenkins et al., 2003). According to this view, children who hear more cognitive mental
state terms will be more focused on the mind as a pivotal indicator in assessing other people’s behav-
ior (Jenkins et al., 2003). Thus, parents may use scaffolding techniques (e.g., explain the relationship
between mental states terms and the mind until children can use them independently) to further
encourage their children’s understanding of mental states (Bruner, 1981). Parents who expose their
children to more mental state terms may have children who understand mental states earlier than
parents who do not challenge their children’s mental state understanding. Consequently, as found
in the current study, these children might also possess an earlier understanding of the role of mental
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states in pretense. This result highlights the impact of environmental factors on children’s develop-
ment of mental state understanding and underscores the need for researchers to explore individual
differences in development as an explanation for varied performance on certain tasks.
Alternative account of understanding mental states in pretense
Overall, performance differences across the three presentation formats provide only limited
support for the action-based and mental state-based accounts of understanding pretend play. In gen-
eral, when an appropriate action was eliminated as an indicator of an actor’s intentions in the Same
Unrelated Action trials, children relied on the actor’s knowledge when making their decision about
who was engaged in pretend activities. However, when action was more difficult to ignore in the Con-
tradictory Action trials, children’s performance declined. Given that children appear to rely on or
ignore action information based on the context of the situation and the discovery of individual differ-
ences in performance, we propose an alternative theory of understanding pretense that incorporates
both action and knowledge. Perhaps it is not that young children are responding only on the basis of
action, as suggested by Lillard (1993), but rather they have difficulty in maintaining an appreciation of
the importance of mental knowledge in the face of certain behavioral actions. Therefore, it might not
be the saliency of action that makes it more difficult; instead, it might be the degree to which the
action conflicts with knowledge that children must ignore. Thus, poor performance is due to children’s
inability to inhibit action information during the mental state task—a skill associated with executive
function.
Given that executive function is related to the ability to appreciate others’ perspectives, it is reason-
able to believe that it would also play a role in how children evaluate mental states (Carlson & Moses,
2001; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002). Previous research has documented a relation between pretend
play and executive function, although findings are inconsistent (see Lillard et al., 2013, for a review).
An executive function-based theory of understanding mental states in pretense would not lend sup-
port or opposition to this previous research but rather would posit that a more developed executive
function system may be necessary for an individual to determine the underlying factors associated
with pretend play. The maintenance of information and inhibition of behavioral information may
explain why children were more likely to select the knowledgeable actor on the Same Unrelated
Action trials compared with the other presentation formats (although significantly different only for
high-scoring children). The Same Related Action trials required children to maintain information
regarding the mental state of both actors on the screen. Children also needed to inhibit processing
of behavioral information because that information was not providing them the information needed
to correctly select the actor who was pretending. The Same Unrelated Action trials, on the other hand,
required maintenance of mental state information but did not require inhibition of behavioral infor-
mation; therefore, they were not as taxing to the underdeveloped executive function system. Given
the current speculation that executive function abilities may be responsible for performance on the
mental state task, future studies should explore the causal relation between these factors.
Limitations and alternative explanations
As with most developmental studies that attempt to understand the mental state of children using
behavioral research, there are multiple interpretations of the resulting data. Although previous studies
(Lillard, 1993; Sobel, 2004) have used the word ‘‘knowledge’’ to categorize the mental state under-
standing of children, it is conceivable that children were not using the knowledge provided to them
for each actor in the way we intended. For example, it is possible that children were selecting the actor
with the positive association with the animal (e.g., the actor who knew about dogs) when asked who
was pretending to be a dog. In essence, children might not have appreciated the actor’s knowledge of
dogs. In addition, children might not have associated the knowledge provided by the experimenter
with a pretend play activity. Because it is odd for someone knowledgeable about dogs to pretend to
be a dog by flapping his arms up and down, children might not have connected the information pre-
sented by the experimenter about the actor’s knowledge with the actor’s mind during pretend play;
rather, they may have selected the actor who the experimenter said was positive for knowing dogs.
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Our interpretations are based on the assumption that children were assigning knowledge to each of
the actors based on the information presented by the experimenter. If, on the other hand, children
were not thinking about the mental state of the actor, our interpretations of the current data would
be inaccurate. If children were simply selecting the actor who was positively paired with the animal,
the current findings do not provide information about mental state understanding in pretense but
instead provide information about how children apply information supplied by experimenters in
studies.
It is also important to consider that children in our study may have been confused by the odd sce-
narios presented to them (e.g., an actor who is behaving similarly to a dog is really knowledgeable
about bunnies) and, therefore, might not have appreciated what the experimenter was telling them
about the knowledge of each actor. Although the scenarios presented to children may appear to be
strange, previous studies have demonstrated children’s willingness to accept as pretending a person
who does not act like or look appropriate regarding the identity he or she is pretending to be
(Ganea et al., 2004; Sobel, 2004). Research also suggests that children at the age we tested are quite
susceptible to labels provided by an adult, especially when the adult is confident and clearly expresses
his or her intent (Gelman & Markman, 1986; Jaswal, 2004; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001). For example,
Gelman and Markman (1986) presented children with a picture of a dolphin and a fish. A third picture
was perceptually more similar to a dolphin, but the experimenter labeled it as exhibiting the behav-
iors associated with the fish. When asked what the animal was, children responded according to the
label presented by the experimenter—that it was a fish—and not according to their own previous
knowledge. Similarly, Jaswal, Lima, and Small (2009) found that children presented with contradictory
information about an object did not necessarily change their perception of that object but instead
were more likely to comply with what the researcher said was the correct label while in the structure
of the experimental setting. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to believe that children will defer to the
adult in the novel situation created by the current study and to trust the information the adult is tell-
ing them in regard to the actor’s behavior even if it contradicts what the children previously believed.
In addition, it is possible that some of our knowledge scenarios might not have been considered as
plausible by children. For example, children might not have been able to conceive that an adult did not
know about dogs or had never seen a dog. As mentioned earlier, research has found that children are
willing to accept what an adult labels something as even if it contradicts preexisting knowledge
(Jaswal, 2004). Many children responded that the actor was silly for not knowing what a dog was
and commented that they themselves knew. Thus, children seemed willing to play along for the pur-
poses of the game we were playing, as has been demonstrated in other studies (Gelman & Markman,
1986; Jaswal, 2004; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001). To eliminate this possible issue, a fictitious animal
could be used in future studies; therefore, children would not have any preexisting ideas regarding
the animal they would need to ignore when listening to the researcher.
Finally, it is interesting that children’s performance did not deteriorate more in the dynamic con-
dition compared with the static condition as hypothesized. The current interpretation of this finding is
that young children are not affected by increasing action saliency, and it is only when faced with con-
tradictory action knowledge that their mental state abilities falter. In the future, it would be interest-
ing to present both types of condition to each child to see whether the comparison of action
information presented in static versus dynamic conditions influenced children’s appreciation of the
mental state of the pretender.
Conclusions
Supporters of the action hypothesis may have overestimated the importance of action in how chil-
dren view pretense activities. In the current study, many children under 5 years of age were capable of
demonstrating an understanding of mental states during pretend play. However, action may play a
more pivotal role for children when they have not yet developed a strong understanding of mental
states or have limited executive function skills, making it more difficult for them to inhibit orienting
their attention toward distracting irrelevant behavioral information. The individual differences exhib-
ited by children in the current study, similar to those found in past studies, may be explained by the
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relationship discovered between parents’ use of mental state terms and their children’s performance
on the mental state task. Parents may play an important role in their children’s mental state under-
standing. Thus, individual differences may play a larger role in pretense mental state understanding
than has been credited in previous research.
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